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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY REORGANIZATION PROCEDURE
IN order to facilitate the sale of mortgage investments, it has for some years been
the practice in New York for mortgage brokerage houses to "certificate" large
mortgages or groups of mortgages, such "certificates" in even amounts of $1,000
or $5,000 purporting to represent undivided interests in the underlying mortgage.
The certificates have then been sold to individual purchasers under a contract and
"policy" whereby the mortgage company has guaranteed the payment of both the
interest and the principal amount of the certificate, and in return has been ap-
pointed irrevocably the agent of the certificate-holder to "service" the mortgage,
for which service it has received a substantial fee., Although this guaranty con-
stituted "insurance," 2 and although the mortgage companies were organized under
and supervised by the State Department of Insurance, the insurance has proved
to be illusory, owing to the fact that no adequate guaranty fund was required by
state law. When, therefore, real estate values declined sensibly below the amount
of the mortgages, the virtual insolvency of the mortgage guaranty companies
was at once recognized, and such companies were, by court orders, placed in the
hands of the Superintendent of Insurance as statutory receiver under the Insurance
Law.3 Thereafter interest could be paid to certificate-holders or other mortgagees
only to the extent that it had actually been collected from the mortgaged premises.
4
Certificate-holders have thus found themselves in a singularly helpless situation.
The owner of an individual mortgage can foreclose and take possession of his col-
lateral, or he can make a new bargain with the mortgagor calculated to induce him
to renewed efforts to pay at least a major portion of his interest. The certificate-
holder could do neither. Moreover, the Superintendent, exercising the functions
of the guaranty companies, had neither the authority, the funds nor the facilities
to foreclose and administer the various properties for the benefit of the certificate-
holders; nor did he possess the authority to make new bargains with the mortgagors
1. This "servicing" has consisted of collecting the interest when due, and seeing to it
that taxes, water rates, and insurance were paid. Under the terms of the policy the
interest was paid when due whether it had been collected from the mortgagor or not.
A differential of one-half of one per cent of the interest collected was retained by the
mortgage company as its fee; that is, if the mortgagor paid 67, the mortgagee was paid
only 552. This differential, plus fees for renewals, et cetera, sufficed to make the business
of the companies highly profitable in prosperous times. Unfortunately for policy-holders,
however, substantially all the profits were paid out to stockholders in dividends, and very
little retained as a guaranty fund.
2. "The guaranty of payment of the principle and interest of mortgage loans constitutes
insurance." United States v. Home Title Insurance Co., 285 U. S. 191, 195 (1932);
cf. Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co., 285 U. S. 182 (1932).
3. In the summer of 1933 fourteen such companies were taken over by the Super-
intendent of Insurance as Rehabilitator, under N. Y. INs. LAw, art. XI.
4. The Superintendent of Insurance in fact prohibited the payment of interest, except
to the extent that it had been collected from the mortgagor, under RULES AND REGULA-
TIONs, published under legislative authority in March, 1933.
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to induce at least partial performance of their original obligations.
5 Since certificate-
holders in any given mortgage were in general numerous, widely dispersed, and un-
known to each other, it was quite out of the question to consider securing their
unanimous consent to any alteration of their contract rights against the mortgagor.
The mortgagor, therefore, confronted in many cases with impossibility of perform-
ance in accordance with the terms of the contract, virtually ceased to perform at all.
It was for the purpose of relieving this intolerable situation of the certificate-
holder that the Schackno Act was passed, as an emergency measure.
6 The Act
provides, in brief, for the reorganization of any certificated mortgage which may
have come into the hands of the Superintendent, who, as statutory receiver under
the Insurance Law, is empowered to exercise the functions of a guaranty company.
7
A copy of the proposed plan of reorganization and timely notice of a judicial hearing
thereon must be mailed by the Superintendent to all certificate-holders in the mort-
gage to be reorganized. If, after such hearing, the court approves the plan, and if,
further, two-thirds in principal amount of the certificate-holders consent, the plan
is ordered into effect with the same binding force as though all certificate-holders
had consented.
Certain minority certificate-holders objected that the procedure thus authorized
is unconstitutional in that it permits a majority of the owners of a common property
to impose their will upon the minority, and thus impairs the obligation of the contract
rights of such minority.8 After several diverse holdings by different justices of
the Supreme Court of New York, appeals were taken in two cases
0 direct to the
Court of Appeals, as is authorized for the hearing of constitutional questions.
10
The two cases were argued together, and the opinion recently handed down in the
decision of one of them sustains the constitutionality of the Act.
11 The court
makes brief mention of analogies justifying the Act as between the parties, with-
out reference to the public good the statute purports to serve. Since it chose
to confine its major attention to a view of the Act in the light of the legislative
intent, however, the court did not press these analogies, but sustained the law rather
as a reasonable exercise by the legislature of its reserved power to safeguard the
"vital interests of the community" by preventing extensive liquidations which would
further demoralize the real estate market, and by providing "an additional remedy
for the enforcement of obligations in a manner fair to all."
It would be foolish to insist that the Court of Appeals should have dealt with
questions which were not necessary to its decision. Nevertheless, its suggestion
that there were grounds other than the "emergency" upon which its decision might
5. The powers of the guaranty companies, to which the Superintendent succeeded,
were extremely limited. The "policy" was distinctly a fair-weather contract.
6. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745.
7. Only the essential features of the Act are here referred to. Many other features
were called into question by Justice Frankenthaler in it re New York Title and Mortgage
Co., 150 Misc. 467 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Some of these are dealt with in the opinion in the
principal case, infra note 11.
8. In In re Title and Mortgage Guarantee Company of Buffalo (Sup. Ct. Erie County,
Dec. 29, 1933), from which the appeal in the principal case was taken, a trustee-depositary
of certain certificates also challenged the constitutionality of the Act.
9. Those referred to in notes 7 and 8, supra.
10. N. Y. Civ. PaRc. AcT (1920) § 588, subd. 3.
11. In re Title and Mortgage Guarantee Company of Buffalo, U. S. Law Week, March
27, 1934, at 14.
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have been placed invites attention to such grounds as possible answers to the con-
stitutional questions raised. The primary objection raised by the dissenting cer-
tificate-holders was that the Schackno proceedings permit a majority of certificate-
holders to impose their will upon the minority. But this objection is strictly without
foundation in fact. The plan of reorganization cannot be put into effect until it
has been approved by a court of equity, and though it is true that "No majority,
however large, can compel a minority, small though it be, to enter into . . . an
agreement against their will,"'2 the power of a court of equity to conclude dissenters
in a plan of reorganization which it approves as "fair" is indubitable.' 3 The "fair-
ness" of a particular plan is, of course, always open to question,14 and federal courts
have developed an extensive doctrine as to the principles of fairness1 which must
be observed in such reorganizations. Plans adopted in proceedings under the
Schackno Act must conform to these principles; and in requiring court approval
of any plan the Act must be presumed expressly to require the application of such
.principles of equity and of "due process of law." The prerequisite of approval of
the plan by two-thirds in amount of the certificate-holders, however, in no way
affects its approval by the court. The two are entirely independent, and under
the Act both are necessary before the plan may be put into effect. 16
Since the type of reorganization here contemplated was both possible and com-
mon without the aid of statutes, it might be thought that the Schackno Act is not
only constitutional, but superfluous. The Act is not needed to authorize the reor-
ganization of a mortgage without the unanimous consent of the mortgage creditors; 17
nor does it purport to confer upon the court any special powers to deal with a
mortgage which has been brought before it for reorganization. It rather limits
the usual powers of the court by the positive requirement of the consent of two-
12. Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401, 404 (1883).
13. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605 (1879); Fearon v. Bankers Trust Co., 238
Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Simon v. New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Rr. Co., 242 Fed.
62 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123 (E. D.
Mo. 1918); P. R. Walsh Tie and Timber Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 280 Fed. 38 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1922); Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922); Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927);
Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 20 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927);
Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New York, 28 F. (2d) 177
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928), certified questions answered, 271 U. S. 445 (1926).
14. Railroad Company v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392 (U. S. 1868); Louisville Trust Co.
v. Louisville Ry. Co., 174 U. S. 674 (1899); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S.
482 (1913); National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (1933); First National Bank
of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 54 Sup. Ct. 298 (1934).
15. For example the "fixed principle" of the Boyd case, supra note 14; the requirement
of "definite, detailed and authentic information" in the Coriell case, supra note 14; and
the means of determining a "fair offer" laid down in First National Bank of Cincinnati
v. Flershem, supra note 14.
16. The requirement of consent of at least a majority of the creditors is in fact a
"principle, of fairness" strongly suggested in the Coriell case, supra note 14. In condemn-
ing the plan in that case, Mr. Justice Brandeis said, at 435: "There was no evidence on
which the court could have found even that a majority of the unsecured creditors favored
the plan."
17. See cases cited note 13, supra.
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thirds of the certificate-holders.' s The law does, however, perform the important
function of according the court a new basis of jurisdiction to hear such plans. The
conventional common-law means of conferring upon a court of equity jurisdiction
of the subject-matter in such cases has been through a petition to confirm a fore-
closure sale.' 9 When the foreclosure sale involved a plan of reorganization the
courts, in the exercise of their equity powers, have felt that they could not confirm
the sale until they had examined and approved the plan of reorganization.
20 Ordinary
equity reorganizations have consequently become inextricably involved with such
fictional, 21 or at least purely formal, intricacies as "judicial sale," "upset price"
and "cash offer," which are difficult to avoid so long as jurisdiction itself is based
upon them. The Schackno Act, in conferring jurisdiction to approve reorganizations
independently of foreclosure sales, at once disposes of these difficulties. The Supreme
Court has, it is true, suggested, 22 and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit has definitely held23 that a judicial sale is not necessary as a matter of right
to accomplish a reorganization where the corporation to be reorganized is in receiver-
ship. But jurisdictional difficulties may be encountered in sustaining a receivership
procured upon the initiative of the corporation, 24 a delicate situation at best.
" 5
A statute conferring jurisdiction, therefore, would in any event appear a better
solution.
Viewed as a regulation of the procedure of the courts of the state, which is
essentially all that it purports to be, the Schackno Act is hardly subject to serious
question. It is the particular province of the legislature to regulate the procedure
of courts which it has created, and it may do so with great freedom so long as the
elemental requirements of a judicial hearing under the federal Constitution are
observed.26 In enacting the composition feature of the National Bankruptcy Act
Congress effected such a procedural regulation for bankruptcy courts. A composition
differs from other bankruptcy proceedings, as the Act indicates 27 and as the Supreme
18. Note 16, supra, will suggest that the two-thirds consent requirement is simply a
definition rather than a limitation of the equity power of the court.
19. This appears in all the cases cited in notes 13 and 14, supra.
20. Cf. particularly Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon Street Corp., 237 App.
Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933).
21. In the Boyd case, supra note 14, the Supreme Court declared, at 506: "As between
the parties and the public generally, the sale was valid. As against creditors, it was a
mere form." In the Clinton Trust Co. case, supra note 20, the court stated: ". . . such
foreclosure sales have become in many instances little more than a step in a plan of
reorganization and refinancing of the mortgaged property . . ." Id. at 793, 263 N. Y.
Supp. at 363.
22. In the Coriell case, supra note 14, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, at 436: "... these
were facts which might have influenced the court in deciding whether the plan should
be approved, or should be approved only upon a public sale." (italics supplied).
23. Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 13; Chicago Rock
Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Hrorse and Mule Commission, 284 Fed. 955 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922).
24. Cf. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, supra note 14; May Hosiery
Mills v. F. and W. Grand Stores, 59 F. (2d) 218 (D. Mont. 1932), rev'd on other grounds,
64 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
25. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36 (1928).
26. Synder v. Massachusetts, 54 Sup. Ct. 330 (1934).
27. "If the composition be confirmed, the statute commands that the bankruptcy pro-
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Court has observed.2 Yet when Congress authorized impairment of creditors' rights
through bankruptcy enforcement of composition agreements, the legislation was
sustained.20 The constitutionality of the composition feature of the National Bank-
ruptcy Act would thus appear to be direct authority for upholding the essentially
similar proceeding under the Schackno Act; for a state has the same power to regulate
the procedure of its courts as Congress has to regulate that of the various federal
courts. Even the "contract" clause of the Constitution, to the extent that it might be
considered to limit state action in such matters, applies equally to the federal govern-
ment as a matter of "due process of law"; and the latter provision is now generally
considered to include within its scope the narrower "contract" clause in the body of the
Constitution. 0
Further grounds for upholding the reorganization procedure of the Schackno
Act and the similar composition feature of the Bankruptcy Act are to be found
in the power of a state, which the Supreme Court has sustained, to make regulations
"for the general advantage of ...owners of a common property" who cannot
agree upon its use.3' Where common action of an entire group is necessary to the
enjoyment of the property, a common "consent" required for such action may be
determined in a reasonable manner prescribed by state law.
Due recognition of the constitutional propriety of judicial reorganization of thi
rights of creditors in the property of their common debtor, when such reorganization
may be for the benefit of creditors as well as the debtor, should lead to reorganiza-
tion statutes of more general application than the Schackno Act. When the contract
obligations of a debtor become impossible of performance, though he is still willing
and able to make better and more productive use of the property involved than
could his creditors, it is surely to the advantage of both that he should be permitted
to do so. Technical insolvency may not be involved, and sale of the property may
be, as a practical matter, impossible. Under such circumstances the formality of
ceedings shall be dismissed; if not confirmed, the estate shall be administered in bank-
ruptcy. BAxRx. AcT. 189S, § 12e. This shows that the composition is separate from the
bankruptcy by the act itself, except as a mere foundation for it." In re Adler, 103 Fed.
444, 446 (W. D. Tenn. 1900).
28. See In re Klein, 1 How. 277 (C. C. D. Mo. 1843); Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902); Cumberland Glass Co. v. DeWitt and Co., 237 U. S. 447
(1915); Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S. 380 (1927), and cases cited.
29. In re Rieman, Fed. Cas. No. 11,675 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1875). In Nelson v. Carland,
1 How. 265 (U. S. 1843), Mr. Justice Catron remarked, at 280, that the word "bankruptcy"
"is employed in the Constitution in the plural, and as part of an expression: 'the subject
of bankruptcies.' The ideas attached to the word in this connection, are numerous and
complicated; they form a subject of extensive and complicated legislation; of this subject,
Congress has general jurisdiction; and the true inquiry is-To what limits is that jurisdiction
restricted? I hold, it extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the
property of the debtor among his creditors; this is the least limit. Its greatest, is the dis-
charge of a debtor from his contracts."
30. Cf. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911); People v. La Fetra, 230
N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921), dismissed on motion of plaintiff, 257 U. S. 665 (1921).
Professor Dodd states in a series of articles on the subject, Impairment of the Obligation
of Contract by State Judicial Decisions (1909) 4 IrL. L. Rzv. 327, 333: "The right of con-
tract is a property right, and therefore falls within the protection of the 'due process law'
clause, which, although broader than the contract guarantee, will be discussed here only in
its bearing on contracts."
31. Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 9 (1885).
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a foreclosure and a "judicial sale" takes on much of the nature of such a "solemn
judicial hoax" as the ancient common recovery. It is to be hoped, therefore, that
if appeal is taken from the present decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
will with more positiveness confirm the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that the
Schackno Act may be sustained on such grounds as have been indicated above.
State courts, under suitable reorganization statutes, could then be given a more
appropriate share of the increasing burden of rehabilitating failed business enter-
prises; and federal courts, with their limited common-law jurisdiction, could be
correspondingly relieved of their virtual monopoly of this class of litigation.
PUBLICATION op FACTS CONCERNING PRODUCT FALSELY ADVERTISED AND
THE LAW OF LIBEL
IN an attempt to remedy an obvious evil disinterested experts, consumers' associa-
tions and others have initiated a movement to place before a public deluged with
false advertisements and misleading labels the factual background necessary for
intelligent evaluation of consumers' goods.' Diffusion of information, frequently
censorious in effect but in fact unbiased, is thus offered as a supplement to the
xelatively ineffective remedy of direct legal attack upon vicious and discreditable
advertising. 2 But the attitude the courts will take toward those responsible for
the dissemination of such analyses is as yet unpredictable. Certainly the law of
libel must be reckoned with, for redress is given to the tradesman when the de-
famatory attack injures him in his business.3 And though libel was in its origin a
tort essentially personal, it has long been established that corporations have interests
which must be accorded similar protection.
4
Indubitably, proof that the facts stated are true is always a conclusive defense
to libel.5 In some jurisdictions the plea may be ineffectual where an individual's
right of privacy has been impugned,6 but it seems improbable that this doctrine
1. KALLET AND ScnHInx, 100,000,000 GuINE PIGs (1933) is a recent popular manifes-
tation. One of the best known agencies is Consumers' Research, a non-profit corporation
located in Washington, New Jersey. In 1933, 45,000 individuals were listed as subscribers
to its "confidential service."
2. See Handler, False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22.
3. Panster v. Wasserman, 190 App. Div. 822, 180 N. Y. Supp. 718 (3d Dep't 1920);
Dabold v. The Chronicle Publishing Co., 107 Wis. 357, 83 N. W. 639 (1900); GATLEY,
LIBEL AND SLANDER (2d ed. 1929) 59.
4. Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Carter, 233 Fed. 832 (D. Wash. 1916); Shoe and
Leather Bank v. Thompson, 23 How. Pr. 253 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1862); ODOERS, LIBEL Aim
SrA Da (6th ed. 1929) 477. A statement charging a corporation with reprehensible business
tactics is libelous per se. Security Benefit Association v. Daily News Publishing Co., 299
Fed. 445 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W. Va.
561, 103 S. E. 923 (1920). But where the disparagement applies only to the product
the corporation must allege special damages. National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor
Fuel Co., 20 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) (where the cases are collected). See (1927)
13 CoRN. L. Q. 136. The possibility of equitable relief is considered in Nims, Unfair
Competition by Disparagement (1933) 19 Com. L. Q. 63.
5. GATLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 172; NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL (4th ed. 1924)
§ 696; ODGERS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 149.
6. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Woodling v. Knickerbocker,
31 Minn. 268, 17 N. W. 387 (1883). Contra: Kimmerle v. New York Evening journal,
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will ever be applied to corporations. 7 Moreover, the policy upon which it is
founded would seem clearly outweighed by the public purpose of protecting against
misleading advertisements. In the circumstances under discussion, therefore, it is
only upon inaccuracy in facts or in conclusions, express or implied, that liability may
be predicated. But even if the statements made are open to question they will not
be actionable if they can be accorded the protection of a qualified or conditional
privilege. A recent case illustrates one type of circumstance under which this de-
fense is available.8 Plaintiff, a corporation, sought damages from a publisher for
an alleged libel in a book devoted to the study of "the waste of the consumer's
dollar."9  The court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings on
the ground that the statement in issue was a fair and impartial report of proceedings
before the Federal Trade Commission and hence was privileged.' 0 The important
incidents of such qualified privilege are that the allegation of falsity is immaterial,1"
and that once the privilege has been established it then becomes incumbent upon
the plaintiff to prove malice.' 2 Another defense to libel in instances of questionable
accuracy is that the statements made are only comment or criticism; 13 but since
this plea is subject to the limitation that the publication must consist merely of
expressions of opinion and must not involve definite assertions,14 it would be of no
avail where the consumer is presented with what purport to be facts.
Rigid adherence to precedent would not admit the plea that the publication was
copied in good faith from reports of scientific tests as a defense sufficient to take
the issue of truth from the jury, for it is said to be a universal rule that one who
republishes a libel is liable even though he states his source. 15 One court has had
the courage to depart from this rule where the source was a reputable news-gather-
262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E. 217 (1933). See Kacedan, The Right of Privacy (1932) 12
B. U. L. REv. 353, 600.
7. See Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982, 935 (D. Mo. 1912).
8. Mack, Miller Candle Co. v. MacM~ilan Co., 239 App. Div. 738, 269 N. Y. Supp. 33
(4th Dep't 1934). Appeal has been taken to the Court of Appeals.
9. The book was CHs. AND ScmLINK, Your MoNEY's WoRTH (1927).
10. Ever since Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (Eng. 1868), it has been settled
law that the privilege attaches to reports of proceedings in legislative bodies. NEWELL,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 448; Davis v. Missourian Publishing Association, 323 Mo. 695,
19 S. W. (2d) 650 (1929). The reports of the Federal Trade Commission have been
assimilated to the favored category. Artloom Corp. v. National Better Business Bureau, 48
F. (2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
11. Leininger v. New Orleans Item Publishing Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411 (1924).
12. Cresson v. Dispatch Printing Co., 291 Fed. 632 (D. Minn. 1923); Cresson v. North
American Co., 280 Pa. 373, 124 AtU. 495 (1924).
13. Comment and criticism on matters which are of public interest are not actionable.
Ruhiand v. Cole, 143 Wis. 367, 127 N. W. 959 (1910); NEWELL, op. cit supra note 5,
§ 482. A most lucid discussion is given in SEELLmAN, LIBEL AND SLANDER iN NEW YORK:
(1933) c. 13.
14. See Sherman v. International Publications, 214 App. Div. 437, 443, 212 N. Y.
Supp. 478, 484 (1st Dep't 1925) ; ODoERS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 161.
15. Palmer v. Mahin, 120 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Kirkland v. Constitution
Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S. E. 821 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 264, 149 S. E.
869 (1929); Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co., 173 Wis. 5, 179 N. W. 788 (1920). But
where punitive damages are sought, republication in good faith may be considered in
mitigation thereof. Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 124 Iowa 707, 100 N. W.
ing agency, 16 but the authority of that case has been considerably weakened.17 It
is submitted, however, that the present problem compels an analysis peculiar to its
facts. The decisions in cases concerned with the libel of a competitor's name or
goods are premised upon the desirable policy of suppressing a method of competition
clearly detrimental to the public interest.' 8 No decision has ever directly involved
the .utterly different question of the treatment to be accorded an unbiased advisor
who in the public interest attempts to shield the consumer from inordinate exploita-
tion.19 A court aware of the unique nature of the problem should hold him
answerable to an entirely different standard. The distinction between the two
cases becomes particularly apparent when there is in issue the rule that to name
the source does not immunize the republisher of a libel. Clearly this rule was
framed to prevent evasion of the strict terms of the law in cases where the law
should be applied. Its reasons vanish where a disinterested non-competitor relies
in good faith upon the research of eminent scientific authority such as the labora-
tories of the American Medical Association.
Certain cases provide the stepping-stone. It has been said that a false and
defamatory statement is not actionable "if fairly made by a person in the discharge
of some public or private duty, whether legal or, moral." 20  In the development of
this qualified privilege the cases have fallen into several well-defined categories,2 '
and in the body of doctrine surrounding it several prerequisites have been enumerated.
Thus, to avoid application of the principle where the facts do not accord with its
spirit, the courts have declared that the test is whether a "legal or moral duty"
is involved.2 2 If this nebulous criterion is deemed inapposite the libel will not be
dismissed, for "the law does not permit a mere volunteer to publish his opinion in
defamation of another merely because he means well by doing so."'23 On the other
867 (1904); Ingals v. Morrissey, 154 Wis. 632, 143 N. W. 681 (1913); see Hlasatel v.
Hoffman, 204 Ill. 532, 539, 68 N. E. 400, 403 (1903).
16. Layne v. The Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933); cf. (1933) 46 Haiv.
L. REv. 1032; Thorson v. Albert Lea Publishing Co., 251 N. W. 177, 180 (Minn. 1933).
17. The case was expressly repudiated under identical facts in Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. Givens, 67 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); see (1934) 32 MicH. L. Ray. 566.
18. The motive is, of course, to obtain unfairly the business of another. See, generally,
Nims, UNraPA CoM-ArrnoN (3d ed. 1929) c. 17. But concomitant with the injury to
the plaintiff is a demoralization of trade; consequently the defendant's acts are inimical
both to the plaintiff and to the public.
19. Cf. Hehmeyer v. Harper's Weekly Corp., 170 App. Div 459, 156 N. Y. Supp. 98
(1st Dep't 1915); Patten v. Harper's Weekly Corp., 93 Misc. 368, 158 N. Y. Supp. 70
(Sup. Ct. 1916). The report of Bendle v. United Kingdom Alliance, 31 T. L. R. 403
(Eng. 1915), is unsatisfactory, but the case seems to be apposite.
20. Baron Parke in Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 181, 193 (Eng. 1834). See
Jones, Interest and Duty in Relation to Qualified Privilege (1924) 22 MicE. L. REV. 437.
21. E.g., Jenoure v. Delmege, (1891) A. C. 73 (answer to confidential inquiry);
Briggs v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr., 66 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) (communication be-
tween officers of a corporation); Bereman v. Power Publishing Co., 27 P. (2d) 749 (Colo.
1933) (publication in labor periodical); Beshiers v. Alien, 46 Okla. 331, 148 Pac. 141
(1915) (communication to sheriff).
22. Pecue v. Collins, 204 App. Div. 142, 197 N. Y. Supp. 835 (3d Dep't 1923).
23. Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293 (1881). But cf. Lord McNaghten, in Jenoure
v. Delmege, supra note 21, at 77: "To protect those who-are not able to protect them-
selves is a duty which every one owes to society."
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hand, the courts have felt free to extend the scope of the defense in proper cases.
And since the privilege has been found for a false statement made in good faith by
a dealer concerning his rival's business methods,24 there is, as has elsewhere been
suggested, "-'3 no reason why it should be denied in the situation under discussion.
The doctrine would be particularly adaptable where the facts under dispute are
derived from an unbiased technical authority of unquestionable integrity. Con-
ceivably the privilege may be lost by excessive publication, for one of its essentials
is that the recipient of the communication must be interested in it.26 But even
though every consumer to whom the information is divulged may not be personally
concerned with each and every product disparaged, a court willing to view the
law of libel in the light of the reasoning and policy behind it might well overlook
so narrow and technical an objection and declare the entire publication a matter of
public interest. This protection, at least, should be accorded those who are zealous
in the welfare of the consumer.
DISCHARGE OF ACCOiMODATION MAKER THROUGH HOLDER'S RELEASE OF SECURITY
IT is well settled that a surety is discharged pro tanto by a creditor's release of se-
curity pledged by the principal for the payment of the principal debt.' Prior to
the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, little difficulty was encountered in
including the accommodation maker within the category of sureties who are dis-
charged by operation of this rule.2 To this result there were few logical objections
for the fact that one is a party to a specialized credit instrument does not preclude
the presence of the same surety relationship upon which the rule was first predicated.3
And such a rule would not defeat the negotiability of credit instruments or their avail-
ability for circulation, since suretyship defenses of the accommodation maker were
often limited to holders other than innocent purchasers for value;4 and even where
this defense was allowed against the latter, it would not seem unduly restrictive, for
the only effect of the rule is to require holders with knowledge of the relationship to
24. Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 144 S. E. 624, 145 S. E. 731 (1928).
25. See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 510, 512.
26. See Jones, supra note 20, at 447. In the mercantile agency cases the privilege, though
granted if the statement is made in answer to inquiry, is denied if published in its gen-
eral "confidential" service. Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188 (1871); Dun & Co. v.
Shipp, 60 S. W. (2d) 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); see Podell and Kirsh, Trade Association
Credit Bureau Functions (1927) 1 ST. Jon's L. REV. 95, 121.
1. Brown v. First National Bank, 132 Fed. 450 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904); First National
Bank v. Watt, 7 Idaho 510, 64 Pac. 223 (1901); Gotzian & Co. v. Heine, 87 Minn. 429,
92 N. W. 398 (1902); ARANT, LAW OF SURETYsHIP AND GUARANTY (1931) § 62; STEARNS,
LAW OF SUanrYsRIP (3d ed. 1922) § 98.
2. Sample v. Cochran, 84 Ind. 594 (1882); Lambert v. Shitler, 62 Iowa 72 (1883);
Hening, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REv. 532,
534.
3. Raymond, Suretyship at "Law Merchant" (1916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 141, 146-147.
See also Guild v. Butler, 127 Mass. 386, 389 (1879).
4. Diversy v. Moor, 22 Ill. 330 (1859); Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich. 441 (1877); Heath v.
Deery, 44 N. H. 174 (1862); Hoge v. Lansing, 35 N. Y. 136 (1866). Contra: Lauman v.
Nichols, 15 Iowa 161 (1863); Fuller v. Quesnel, 63 Minn. 302 (1895).
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act as prudent men in preserving the security pledged by the debtor.5 Since the
enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, however, there has been some ques-
tion as to whether an accommodation maker may still be regarded as a surety who
may avoid liability where the holder has released security pledged by the principal for
the payment of the debt.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently faced this issue in an action by the holder
of a note against the accommodation maker where the latter offered as a defense a
discharge by the plaintiff of a mortgage pledged as security for the payment of the
note.6 The note and mortgage in question were executed by the defendant and her
husband, the former signing the note as accommodation maker and joining in the
mortgage to release dower rights in the property. After execution of these docu-
ments, the plaintiff acquired the ownership of the mortgaged premises by an ab-
solute deed of gift in which the defendant and her husband joined. Having sub-
sequently purchased the note and mortgage from a third party, the plaintiff released
the mortgage and sued the defendant on her obligation on the note. While the court
expressly stated that under the Negotiable Instruments Law suretyship defenses are
not available to parties on a negotiable note, it in effect extended to the defendant
the suretyship defense of release of security, by construing the promise of the
accommodation maker as one to become liable only for any deficiency which might
result after a foreclosure of the mortgage.
7
In cases raising a somewhat analogous issue, it has been held that under the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law an accommodation maker, being a party "primarily" liable
under Section 192 of the Act, can no longer avail himself of an extension of time to
the principal since the only defenses open to persons "primarily" liable are those
enumerated in Section 119 of the Act, which do not include the so-called suretyship
defenses.8 While this reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to the avail-
ability to the accommodation maker of the defense of release of collateral security by
the holder of the note, the question is not necessarily foreclosed, for certain distin-
guishing considerations may afford a basis for extending to the accommodation mak-
er the suretyship defense of release of security by the holder, while denying him
the defense of an extension of time to the principal debtor. There is slight justifica-
tion in allowing the latter to the surety or accommodation maker, since any pos-
sible prejudice to his position seems to be remote.9 Although this defense was first
5. See Duncan, Fox & Co. v. North and South Wales Bank, 6 App. Cas. 1, 15 ( 0SSO);
BRANNAN, NEGOTIADLE INsTRuFTs LAW (5th ed. 1932) 885-886.
6. Goodman v. Goodman, 187 N. E. 777 (Ohio 1933).
7. The instant case differs somewhat from the usual situation involving a release of se-
curity by the creditor, in that the discharge of the mortgage inured to the benefit of the
creditor himself rather than to the principal debtor or other pledgor of the property. This
benefit to the creditor results from the fortuitous fact that in an independent transaction
the principal debtor made a gift to the plaintiff of the equity of redemption in the mort-
gaged property.
8. Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); Fox v. Terre Haute National
Bank, 78 Ind. App. 666, 129 N. E. 33 (1920); Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass.
205, 98 N. E. 679 (1912); Cellars v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907). See Note
(1927) 48 A. L. R. 715, indicating that all states but Iowa, Missouri and Texas have adopt-
ed this view.
9. The purely technical nature of the defense has occasioned considerable criticism of
the rule. See 2 WILSTON, CoNTiRACrS (1920) § 1222; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921)
35 H RV. L. Rav. 113, 117. See also First National Bank v. Livermore, 90 Kan. 395, 400,
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predicated on the view that an extension agreement bound the surety's hands,
prejudicing him to the extent of the consequent delay in his rights against the prin-
cipal,10 the assumption seems unfounded and it is extremely doubtful that a surety
would be denied immediate relief against the principal if he pursued the proper
remedies. While a binding extension of time between principal and holder will
prevent the surety-maker from obtaining upon maturity and payment of the original
obligation an immediate right of subrogation," it will not preclude him, if he wishes
to pay his obligation at maturity, from taking immediate steps against the principal
under an implied contract of reimbursement; 12 nor from enforcing against him
before payment an immediate right of exoneration.' 3 Moreover, in jurisdictions
where the surety can protect himself from loss caused by the creditor's delay in
proceeding against the principal by giving notice to the creditor to proceed at once
against the principal debtor on penalty of discharge under the doctrine of Paine v.
Packarda4 or statutes based thereon, 15 an extension of time would not affect the im-
133 Pac. 734, 736 (1913). The modification of the rule in the case of commercial sureties
to the effect that such sureties will be discharged by an extension of time only to the extent
of the consequent injury, can probably be attributed in part to the technical nature of
the defense. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 178 Fed. 721
(C. C. E. D. Pa. 1910); Philadelphia v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 231 Pa. 208, 80 Atl. 62
(1911).
10. SamuelU v. Howarth, 3 Mer. 272 (1817).
11. Since the person subrogated gets only those rights and remedies which the creditor
has against the principal, an extension of time would seem to preclude the surety from
getting any immediate rights against the principal by subrogation until the maturity of the
extension agreement. See 2 STORY, EQunry JUSPRuDENcE (14th ed. 1918) §§ 706-726;
Arant, Why a Release of Security Discharges a Surety (1930) 14 MN. L. REv. 725, 726.
12. When a contract of suretyship is made, an implied contract arises that the principal
will indemnify the surety for any payment the latter may make to the creditor in compli-
ance with the contract of suretyship. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Cen-
tropolis Bank, 17 F. (2d) 913, 916 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); American Surety Co. v. De Carle,
25 F. (2d) 18, 20 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928). Since the principal and holder can hardly bind the
accommodation maker not a party to the extension agreement, it would seem that at ma-
turity of the note the latter would be privileged to pay and thereby discharge his liability to
the holder. Such payment would be one in compliance with the suretyship contract and
therefore would give the surety an immediate right of reimbursement against the prin-
cipal debtor. See 2 WiLLIsToN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 1225.
13. The right of exoneration is given immediately upon maturity of the surety's obli-
gation. West Huntsville Cotton Mills Co. v. Alter, 164 Ala. 305, 51 So. 338 (1910); Val-
dosta Bank & Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 145 Ga. 336, 89 S. E. 216 (1916); Des Moines Bridge
& Iron Works. v. Plane, 163 Iowa 18, 143 N. W. 866 (1913) ; Hutchinson Wholesale Grocer
Co. v. Brand, 79 Kan. 340, 99 Pac. 592 (1909). Since the accommodation maker is not
bound by the extension between the holder and the principal debtor, it would seem that
the existence of such an agreement would not affect his remedy of exoneration.
14. 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816). See Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 971, indicating
that the surety has this remedy in one form or another in a majority of the states. The
rights of the surety under this rule are generally extended to accommodation parties on
negotiable instruments. Baker v. Whittaker, 177 Ky. 197, 197 S. W. 644 (1917); Martins-
burg Bank v. Bunch, 212 MVfo. App. 249, 251 S. W. 742 (1923). But cf. Rich v. Warren, 135
Ga. 394 (1910) (defense not available against a holder in due course who took without
notice of the suretyship relationship).
15. See Comment (1928) 37 YALF L. J. 971, 973, n. 9 for a collection of the statutes.
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mediate efficacy of this remedy. The unsubstantial character of this defense is evi-
dent from the fact that it can be destroyed by a mere informal recitation at the
time of the extension agreement that the creditor reserves his rights of recourse against
the surety.16 On the other hand, it is apparent that a release of security pledged for
the payment of a debt will render worthless the surety's right of subrogation to that
security and -will materially injure his ability to save himself harmless if he is
compelled to pay the obligation at maturity.17 Since it is considered equitable that
as between a party ultimately liable for a debt and one who, for the convenience of
one of the parties, has merely asumed liability with rights of indemnification, the
former should bear the burden of the debt, it does not seem unfair to require the
creditor with knowledge of the relationship to retain securities pledged by the prin-
cipal.' 8
Moved perhaps by the difference in the merits of the two defenses, at least two
courts which under the Negotiable Instruments Law deny the accommodation maker
the defense of extension of time to the principal debtor,' 9 have discharged him from
liability where there has been a release of security by the holder of the note. 0
And Masachusetts, long a leader in denying an accommodation maker the defense
of extension of time,2 ' has declared that where security is released by the payee of a
note, a surety-maker may be exonerated to the extent of his injury.22 The court
in the instant case in according the accommodation maker the defense of release of
collateral security, by deciding that his bargain was merely to pay a deficiency which
16. Hodges v. Elyton Land Co., 109 Ala. 617, 20 So. 23 (1896) ; Jones v. Sarchett, 61
Iowa 520, 16 N. W. 589 (1883); Dean v. Rice, 63 Kan. 691, 66 Pac. 992 (1901).
17. Such a release is regarded as so seriously prejudicing the surety that he is allowed a
pro tanto discharge even where the security released was a lien obtained by the creditor's
instituting court proceedings on his own initiative and at his own expense. Mt. Sterling Im-
provement Co. v. Cockrell, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1151, 70 S. W. 842 (1902) (judgment Hen);
Bank of Missouri v. Matson, 26 Mo. 243 (1858) (attachment lien); Williams v. Brown,
70 W. Va. 472, 74 S. E. 409 (1912) (judgment lien); ef. First National Bank v. Foster,
291 Pa. 72, 139 AtI. 609 (1927) (release of judgment on note did not discharge surety where
release was to avoid threatened bankruptcy proceedings).
18. That the pro tanto discharge of the surety by a release of security is not based
on contract rights but on the inherent equities in the suretyship relationship, has long been
recognized. See Henderson v. Huey, 45 Ala. 275, 278 (1871); Cummings v. Little, 45 Me.
183, 187 (1858); Brown Carriage Co. v. Dowd, 155 N. C. 307, 319, 71 S. E. 721, 726 (1911);
STE-kUs, op. cit. supra note 1, § 98.
19. First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175 S. W. 10 (1915); Smith v. Minneap-
olis Threshing Machine Co., 89 Okla. 156, 214 Pac. 178 (1923).
20. Southern National Life Realty Corp. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 80, 198 S. W. 543
(1917); Strother v. Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 216 Pac. 436 (1923). In an Illinois case an
accommodation maker was discharged by the holder's release of security, but the Negotiable
Instruments Law was not discussed. Lawrence v. Hammond, 208 Ill. App. 31 (1917). In
Texas and Missouri where the accommodation maker is released by an extension of time to
the principal debtor, he has also been discharged because of release of security. Long v.
Mason, 273 Mo. 266, 200 S. W. 1062 (1918); Lee v. First National Bank, 254 S. W. 394
(Tex. Civ. App. 1923). Cf. Merchant's Nat. Bank of Billings v. Smith, 59 Mont. 280, 196
Pac. 523 (1921) (release of collateral security did not release accommodation maker as
against holder in due course but there is a dictum to the effect that the result would
have been otherwise as against one not a holder in due course).
21. Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, supra note 8.
22. See Durfee v. Kelly, 228 Mass. 571, 573, 117 N. E. 907, 908 (1917).
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might arise after foreclosure of the mortgage given as security for the note, reached
the same result, but used a questionable device to support its decision. For it is well
settled that the holder of a note is not obliged to pursue the security in his hands
before resorting to the personal liability of parties to the instrument. 23
There appear to be at least three methods by which the court in the instant case
could have reached the same result under the Negotiable Instruments Law. It
may be said that the defense of release of security is open to the accommodation
maker under Section 119 (4) of the Act, providing for a discharge of the instrument
"by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money." 24
Although endorsed by commentators, 25 this defense has been rejected by courts
considering the effect of an extension of time on the surety-maker's liabilities, on
the ground that it applies only to a discharge of the instrument and that the release
of a surety was never sufficient to discharge the instrument itself.26 Secondly, it
can be argued that since the Negotiable Instruments Law nowhere provides for the
discharge of the individual liability of persons "primarily" liable, except as may fol-
low from the discharge of the instrument under Section 119, cases raising the issue
are not specifically provided for in the Act and are to be governed by the law
merchant pursuant to Section 196 of the Act.27 Used successfully by a Teias court
to support a discharge of an accommodation maker through an extension of time to
the principal debtor,28 this argument would seem to be equally applicable to cases
involving a release of security by a plaintiff holder.29 But perhaps the most satis-
factory rationale is that available under Section 58 of the Act, which provides that
in the hands of persons other than holders in due course, a negotiable instrument is
subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable.30 Since an accommoda-
tion maker on a non-negotiable note would be discharged by the holder's release
of security pledged for the payment of the debt,31 this affords an adequate device for
reaching the same result under the Negotiable Instruments Law. This argument,
23. Thompson v. Fourth National Bank of Montgomery, 214 Ala. 452, 108 So. 69
(1926); Williams v. Parker, 30 Cal. App. 71, 157 Pac. 550 (1916); Polk-Genung-Polk Co.
v. McGhee, 248 S. W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). This doctrine was accorded verbal rec-
ognition in the instant case, Goodman v. Goodman, supra note 6, at 781, but the court's
statement appears to be inconsistent with it.
24. This has been stated to be the ground upon which the court in the instant case has
rested its decision. (1934) 18 MDr=. L. Rav. 473. While the court alludes to § 119(4) of
the N. I. L., it does not base its conclusion on that section.
25. BnANNAw, op. cit. supra note 5, at 884-889; Street, Effect of Negotiable Instruments
Law on Liability of Surety (1907) 11 LAw NoTEs 1050.
26. Vanderford v. Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 105 Md. 164, 66 Atl. 47
(1907); Richards v. Market Exchange Bank Co., 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000 (1910);
Oklahoma State Bank v. Seaton, 69 Okla. 99, 170 Pac. 477 (1918); Wolstenholme v. Smith,
34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908).
27. Cf. Frazier v. First National Bank, 2 Ohio App. 159 (1913), where the court re-
lieved an accommodation indorser from liability because of a release of security by the
holder on the ground that such a release, being a defense not mentioned in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, was to be governed by the law merchant under section 196 of the Act.
28. Howth v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 280 S. W. 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
29. For a general discussion of the application of the rules of suretyship in the law
merchant, see Raymond, supra note 3; Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. Rav. 954.
30. This argument was used in Southern National Life Realty Corp. v. People's Bank,
supra note 20.
31. Note 1, supra.
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however, would be more restricted in its application in that it fails to afford accom-
modation parties relief against holders in due course, despite their knowledge of the
accommodation relationship.
32
The fact that courts have rejected most of these arguments in refusing to release
the accommodation maker where there was an extension of time between holder and
principal, will make it difficult to embrace them in support of a contrary result where
the accommodation maker's defense is a release of collateral security. However, since
substantial equities favor the discharge of a surety where there has been a release
of securityas and since such a defense was uniformly given accommodation makers
prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law and is not specifically denied under the
Act, ingenious courts may avail themselves of the factual distinctions between the
two situations in allowing the accommodation maker a discharge under the Negotiable
Instruments Law where the holder has released security pledged by the principal for
the payment of the debt.
AWARD oF DAMAGES AS A CONDITION OF DENYING SPECIFIC PERFOR ANCE
THE wide discretion exercised by a court of equity as to the form of remedy it
may choose is strikingly illustrated in a recent decision of the New York Court
of Appeals.' The claimant had taken a lease, with an option to purchase, of a
portion of a village lot on which it erected a gasoline station. Subsequently the
lessor sold the entire lot, including the leased premises, to the respondents, mem-
bers of the board of education of the local school district, who were at the same
time fully informed of the option. Thereafter the claimant sought to exercise its
option, and upon the refusal of the respondents to make the conveyance, sued for
specific performance of the lessor's agreement, or in the alternative, for damages
for its breach. Despite the fact that the claimant could not have maintained an action
at law for damages against the respondents, the court conditioned its denial of specific
performance upon the requirement that the latter pay damages for the loss sus-
tained by the claimant as a result of its failure to obtain a conveyance pursuant to
the terms of the option.
Where an award of specific performance would result in undue hardship to the
defendant, a court of equity may deny that relief and grant an alternative remedy
better adapted to the situation.2 Impossibility of performance by the defendant
because of a conveyance to an innocent purchaser or because of the destruction of
the property, while perhaps the most common reason for denying the specific en-
forcement of land contracts, 3 is by no means exclusive. The fact that the perform-
ance to be rendered would be contrary to the public welfare is considered sufficient
reason for its denial.4 In the present case the respondents, after purchasing the
property, had erected a grade school thereon, and it was conceded that the main-
32. This defense would be available against the holder in the instant case since he was
not a holder in due course, having taken the instrument after maturity.
33. Note 18, supra.
1. Wheeler v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 263 N. Y. 34, 188 N. E. 148 (1933).
2. Marks v. Gates, 154 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907); Speer v. Erie Rr. Co., 6S N.
J. Eq. 615, 60 Atl. 197 (1905); CONTRAcTS RF.STATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 367 (b).
3. Dunlop v. Baker, 239 Fed. 193 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916); Rosen v. Mayer, 224 Mass.
494, 113 N. E. 217 (1916); CONTRACTS RESTATE MNT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 368.
4. Id. § 369.
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tenance of a gasoline station on the premises would be dangerous and objectionable.
Under such circumstances a refusal of specific performance was clearly within the
discretion of the court.
That a court of equity may retain a bill for the purpose of assessing damages,
even though it denies specific relief, has long been recognized.5 As a prerequisite
it is generally said that the bill must state a proper case for the interposition of
equity and that the only reason for refusal of the decree asked is because perform-
ance has become either impossible or for some reason inequitable. 6 Furthermore,
the defendant must owe some obligation to the plaintiff for the breach of which he
would be liable in damages had the latter initially elected to proceed at law.7 In
the instant case it is clear that the respondents, having had notice of the claimant's
exclusive option to buy the premises, took the land subject to the exercise of the
option and to the claimant's right to its specific enforcement.8 However, since the
respondents had assumed none of the lessor's obligations, they would not be liable
in an action at law for damages for failure to make the conveyance.9 As the court
pointed out, the lessor alone and not his transferee would be liable for the breach.' 0
In the many cases in which alternative relief has been granted, courts have con-
sistently adhered to the rules ordinarily applicable to those remedies,'" and to this
extent the present decision, in awarding damages where they could not have been
recovered at law, appears to be unique. Nevertheless, in granting such a conditional
decree,' 2 the court arrived at an equitable solution of the controversy, even though
it may have outstepped the bounds of former decisions. The damages may be said
to have been awarded not for breach of any contractual obligation, but merely as
an alternative to the enforcement of the respondents' duty to convey the property.
5. Hedges v. Everard, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 18, pl. 7 (1699); Denton v. Stewart, 1 Cox.
Eq. 258 (1786) ; Lord Cairn's Act, 21 and 22 Vicr. c. 27, § 2 (1858).
6. Graves v. Ashburn, 215 U S 331 (1909); Braig v. Frye, 199 Iowa 184, 199 N.
W. 977 (1924); Barton v. Molin, 225 Mich. 8, 195 N. W. 797 (1923); Merry Realty Co.
v. Shamokin & Hollis Real Estate Co., 230 N. Y. 316, 130 N. E. 306 (1921).
7. Lewis v. Woodbine Savings Bank, 182 Iowa 190, 165 N. W. 410 (1917); Livesley
v. Johnston, 48 Ore. 40, 53, 84 Pac. 1044, 1049 (1906).
8. Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368 (1890); Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 37
N. E. 73 (1894); Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright, 11 Ch. D. 421 (1879).
9. As stated by Chancellor Kent, "The remedy . . . against the assignee may be said
to be in ren rather than in personam." Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 398, 402 (N.
Y. 1822).
10. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 707 (1880); Meyers v. Markham, 90
Minn. 230, 235-6, 96 N. W. 787 (1903).
11. "If a plaintiff in good faith sues for specific enforcement, and that relief is denied,
damages or restitution may be awarded in the same proceeding, subject to the rules appli-
cable to those remedies." CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 363 (italics
added).
12. The power of a court of equity to make its decree conditional on some perform-
ance by the plaintiff is well established. City of La Follette v. La Follette Water, Light,
& Telephone Co., 252 Fed. 762 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918). It may also refuse its decree unless
the plaintiff consents to some substituted performance by the defendant. Willard v. Tay-
oe, 8 Wall. 557, 567 (U. S. 1859). Conditional decrees by a court of law are rare, but
not unknown. See, e. g., Sir Anthony Sturlyn v. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67 (Eng. 1587) (execu-
tion conditional on plaintiff's release of defendant's arrearages of rent) ; Noyes v. Brown, 142
Minn. 211, 171 N. W. 803 (1919) (execution conditional upon deposit of deed by plaintiff).
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And if the respondents prefer to do the latter, instead of paying the amount decreed,
they are apparently at liberty to do so. No unreasonable hardship results to either
party, and relief is thus granted, within the broad powers of equity, "on such terms
and conditions as justice requires.
1 3
APPLICABILITY OF A CHAIN STORE TAX TO FILLING STATIONS
THE Indiana chain store tax,' unsuccessfully resisted by a grocery chain in the
Jackson case, 2 has now been subjected to attack by a distributor of petroleum prod-
ucts bringing suit to enjoin the application of the tax to filling station chains. 3
13. CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 359 (2). ". . . a court of equity
... may withhold from a plaintiff the complete relief to which he would otherwise be en-
titled if the defendant is willing to give in its stead such substituted relief as, under the
special circumstances of the case, satisfies the requirements of equity and good conscience."
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 290 U. S. 264,
271 (1933).
1. InD. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 9734.5. This section requires "every person,
firm, corporation, association or copartnership opening, establishing, operating, or main-
taining one or more stores or mercantile establishments . . . under the same general man-
agement, supervision, or ownership" to pay a license tax annually on each store. After the
Jackson case, infra note 2, the rate of progression originally adopted was increased to the
following:
1 Store . . . . $ 3
2-5 Stores . . . $ 10 for each additional share
6-10 " . $ 20 " it it cc
11-20 " . . $ 30 " " " "
Over 20 " . . $150 " " " "
Ind. Acts 1933, c. 271, p. 1229.
2. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931), a five-to-four
decision reversing the unanimous opinion of a three-judge federal court, Jackson v. State
Board of Tax Commissioners, 38 F. (2d) 652 (S. D. Ind. 1930). The case is the subject
of an annotation in Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 1481. For a collection of cases on this and
closely allied subjects, see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Morrissett, 58 F. (2d) 991,
992 (E. D. Va. 1931). For subsequent cases, see Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Tax
Commission, 55 F. (2d) 931 (E. D. S. C. 1932); Penny Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 59 F. (2d)
789 (S. D. Miss. 1932); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933) (indicating a limitation
on the rule of the Jackson case).
For comment on the chain store tax problem, see Becker and Hess, The Chain Store License
Tax (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rnv. 113; Comment (1932) 12 B. U. L. Rav. 174; Legis. (1931)
31 COL. L. REv. 145; Legis. (1931) 44 Hnv. L. Rav. 456; (1931) 44 HtAv. L. Rav. 1295;
Note (1931) 17 IowA L. BurLa. 72; Comment (1931) 6 ST. Jon's L. Rav. 163; Comment
(1933) 7 ST. JoINa's L. Rav. 350; Legis. (1931) U. or PA. L. REV. 289; Comment (1931)
40 YALE L. J. 431. See also ZIMMERMAN, THE CHALLENGE Or CHAIN STORE DrsTRIUTON
(1931) 287 et seq.
3. This possibility was mentioned in Comment (1931) 7 IND. L. J. 179, 186, n. 37.
Statutes almost identical with the Indiana law have in two cases been held inapplicable
to filling stations. Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, infra note 10; Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. Fox, decided March 1, 1934, by a three-judge federal court (S. D. W. Va.). In
the latter case, reported briefly in U. S. Law Week, March 27, 1934, at 16, it was held
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The plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, operated within the state ten of its own service
stations and six "bulk stations";4 it also leased station equipment and sold its
products for resale to the operators of sixteen other gasoline outlets. The only
sales made at any of the stations were of petroleum products. The Tax Board, it
was alleged, intended to enforce payment of the progressive chain store license tax
on all thirty-two units as one chain, and to collect the taxes which had accrued dur-
ing each year since the law was enacted. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained
and the plaintiff appealed to the state Supreme Court. Although the opinion con-
ceded that the requisite "differences in practices and advantages between the opera-
tion of a single and a chain of stores5 may vary with the lines of merchandise han-
dled," the court refused to find the tax so discriminatory as to be unconstitutional. 6
It recognized that the legislation was more than a mere revenue measure and held
that the dangers of monopoly inherent in the growth of the chains, and the necessity
of protecting the small merchant, justified the tax as an exercise of the state's police
power.7 Plaintiff's contention that filling stations did not come within the purview
of the Act as "stores" was rejected and the decision on the demurrer affirmed.
8
It is at least debatable that the terms "store" and "mercantile establishment" as
used in the Act properly include gasoline filling stations. Although lexicographically
such a construction may be permissible,9 common or colloquial usage would probably
that the imposition on gasoline stations of the heavy West Virginia tax would be discrimina-
tory between groups within the chain store class itself, since it was shown that commodity
chains would not be excessively burdened, while filling stations would pay about 85% of
the total tax collected from chain stores and would forfeit almost their entire margin of
profit. Distinguishing the gasoline service station from the "chain store" as such, the court
questioned the validity or even the existence of any inhibitive public policy in the case
of filling stations, and declined, in any event, to uphold the application of the tax on
police power grounds in the absence of any legislative statement thereof.
4. Bulk stations are large storage depots from which gasoline is ordinarily distributed
to retail outlets, although in some cases sales directly to consumers are made there. Plaintiff
denied that its bulk stations made any retail sales.
5. In State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, supra note 2, at 534, the court
enumerated the differences between chain and independent operation which justify
classification for taxation purposes.
6. The plaintiff invoked the equality guaranties of the state constitution. IND. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 23; art. 10, § 1. These provisions were also pleaded in the Jackson case, supra
note 2, in which the United States Supreme Court, at 542, stated that the first was sub-
stantially the same as the Fourteenth Amendment, and found that the Indiana decisions
rendered the second inapplicable to this type of tax.
7. The chain store tax cases have heretofore been decided on revenue rather than on
police power grounds. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433,
154 S. E. 838 (1930), aff'd per curiam, 284 U. S. 575 (1931); State Board of Tax Commis-
sioners v. Jackson; Liggett Co. v. Lee, both supra note 2. It is generally recognized, how-
ever, that such taxes are in intent and effect regulatory or police power measures. In 42
of the 44 state legislatures in session in 1933, a total of 132 bills were introduced for the
regulation or taxation of chains. ANNuAL REPORT or THE FEDERAL TRADE CoarIssion
(1933) 55.
8. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 187 N. E. 882
(Ind. 1933).
9. IND. A=n. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 9734.8 brings within the scope of the Act
stores or mercantile establishments "in which goods, wares or merchandise of any kind,
are sold, either at retail or wholesale." That filling stations need not necessarily be in-
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make the distinction, as the Wisconsin court has pointed out in a substantially similar
case.10 There is also some doubt as to the original intention of the legislature to
include filling stations," since the struggle of the independents against the chains,
of which this statute is admittedly a manifestation, is conducted primarily on other
fronts.'2 It may be argued, moreover, that if the tax were intended to reach the
plaintiff's type of business, the great variety of possible producer-distributor-retailer
relationships' 3 would normally call for more specific statutory standards than are
cluded in such statutes was conclusively determined in Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra note 2.
See also Southern Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Tax Commission, supra note 2, in which, approv-
ing the exemption of gasoline stations, the court said, at 933, "Furthermore, such filling
stations are quite distinct from ordinary stores or mercantile establishments." But cf.
Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co., 277 Pa. 289, 121 At. 53 (1923).
10. Wadhams Oil Co. v. State, 245 N. W. 646, 649 (Wis. 1932). Asked to hold that
gasoline stations were included within the terms of an almost identical law, the court took
the view that "if one were to stop five hundred well-informed intelligent persons traveling
into any city and ask them to stop at the first store or mercantile establishment where
goods, wares, or merchandise were sold or offered for sale, it is quite probable that not a
single one would stop at a filling station or service station such as is described in the
plaintiff's complaint." A motion for rehearing was denied, 246 N. W. 687 (Wis. 1933).
This also was the view adopted by the court in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Fox,
supra note 3.
11. Originally, as a bill, the measure contained a clause expressly exempting filling sta-
tions. This was deleted by the state Senate and omitted from the Act as finally approved.
This legislative history weighed heavily with the trial court, but was explained by the
plaintiff as merely the elimination of surplusage from the statute. It should be noted that
the amendment of 1933, supra note 1, made no attempt to resolve the question and clarify
the status of gasoline stations, although the instant case had directly raised the issue
in Indiana at the time of the amendment. Unless the statute is viewed as a policy law,
the intent thus to secure revenue from gasoline stations is in some measure negatived by
the existence of a tax of 4 cents per gallon, already levied on the use of gasoline. IND.
AN. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929) § 10178; Ind. Acts 1932, c. 68, p. 249.. It is said that
approximately a fourth of the average retail price of gasoline represents taxes. See
PETROLEum FAcTs Asm FiGuREs (4th ed. 1931) 56, 76. And provision for the' policing of
gasoline distribution was made elsewhere. Retail dealers are required to pay a fee of $1
for a dealer's license and to post a substantial bond. Iwo. ANm. STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1929)
§ 10187.1. Plaintiff alleged that compliance with various regulations for the inspection of
gasoline and other products had entailed an expense of $1,525.58 in 1930 and $3,785.94 in
1931. It is also significant that plaintiff's allegation that the application of the tax to
filling stations was not claimed until November, 1931-that is, until the statute had been
approved in the Jackson case-was stricken on defendant's motion as immaterial and
irrelevant and tending to cloud the issues, but not as being contrary to fact.
12. The conflict appears to be sharpest in the grocery and drug store field. The AxNuAuu
REPO RT or TuE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIOx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 30, in discussing the
reports made to Congress of its comprehensive inquiry into the chain store problem, does
not mention filling stations.
13. There are four main classes of relationship: (a) the strictly independent retailer
who buys unbranded gasoline and sells it on his own terms; (b) the independent who may
own his own station but contracts to sell one or more branded lines as such; (c) the
"lease-and-agency" dealer who leases his station and equipment either on a fixed or gallonage
rental and sells branded products as an agent of the producer; (d) the chain or company
operator, employed on salary and/or commission to run the company-owned station.
provided 14 for administrative guidance in distinguishing chain stations from inde-
pendents.
Even conceding the applicability of the statute, however, the tax cannot be upheld
unless the discrimination made between classes within the general group is referable
to some reasonable and substantial basis of classification.15 In the Jackson case the
statute was found to be valid as applied to grocery stores, but several of the elements
there held to make up a combination of sufficiently differentiating features16 are not
readily discernible in the case of gasoline stations. A given brand of gasoline, whether
sold by a chain station or an independent, is usually advertised by the producer, who
furnishes distinctive display equipment to all stations retailing that brand. Chain
"concentration of management" and "skill in buying" are discounted by the com-
parative simplicity of merchandising so undiversified a line of products. Warehous-
ing and distributive advantages are likewise common to all stations because of the
high degree of transportation mobilization developed by the producers. Furthermore,
the general tendency is to stabilize the retail price of a given brand so far as possible,
thus answering one of the stock complaints of the independent class of retailer in
general.' ? And owing to the urgent desire of the producer to have as many retail
outlets as possible to market its products in competition with other producers,' 8 the
presence of undue advantages as between retailers of its product would be subversive
of its policy, whether such outlets were its own stations, local retail chains, or inde-
pendents. The classification here attempted therefore is not so apparent as in the
Jackson case; in petroleum distribution the line of distinction appears between the
retailers, both chain and independent, of competing brands, rather than between
chains and independents as such.
The basis of the legislative policy, moreover, whatever the arguments with regard to
chains in other lines, is not clear in the case of filling stations. It may be questioned
whether, as was urged by the instant court, the "stability of the local community"
The NRA Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, PRENTiCE-HALL FE.
TRADE & IND. SERV., par. 12,321, has attempted to introduce some regulation, particularly
attacking the lease-and-agency contract. See generally, Petroleum Code, supra, art. 5,
rules 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 19, 20; Opinion of the Federal Trade Commission, Nov. 1, 1933, PREN-
ncr-HALL FED. TRADE & IND. SERv., par. 12,343; see also the Marketing Agreement adopted
Dec. 7, 1933, approved Jan. 19, 1934, id., par. 12,362. In the absence, however, of a
limited number of compulsory form contracts which may be readily classified in advance,
the determination of the degree of control exercised by the supplier over the retail outlets
must remain in many cases a matter of conjecture. Rule 26, for example, permits the sup-
plier to contract with the retailer for a minimum resale price; and such elements as price
terms and powers of cancellation will continue to complicate the problems of administra-
tion of the tax.
14. Supra note 1.
15. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 (1920); Louisville Gas & Electric
Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389
(1928) ; Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra note 2.
16. Note 5, supra.
17. These and other examples of the unreasonableness of the classification, within the
rule of the Jackson case, were alleged in the complaint and met only by demurrer.
18. The major profits of the industry are made in refining. This, in addition to the
intense competition, explains the drive to secure as great a volume and as many outlets as
possible. It also explains the willingness to maintain elaborate, company stations and to
give premiums, cash discounts, and "customer's cards." In the latter connection, see
Petroleum Code, supra note 13, art. 5, rules 3, 13, 16, 17.
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will be seriously menaced by the differences in the amounts of business transacted re-
spectively by chain and independent stations "with local bankers, wholesalers,
mechanics, artisans, and farmers." The disposition of the profits of the producer-
supplier will be the same, whether derived from sales by chain or independent
operators; land must be bought or leased; the wages or profits of the operator,
whether employee or proprietor, will in all probability be spent locally. And the
phenomenal growth in the number of independent stations in recent yearsl o nega-
tives the immediacy of dangerous monopolistic tendencies in gasoline retailing.
The tax is also open to attack on grounds of economic theory. It might be possi-
ble for the large companies substantially to defeat the purpose of the statute and
maintain the status quo by including the increased cost of chain operation in the
wholesale price charged to the independents-a result clearly inimical to the interests
of the consumer, who would thus ultimately shoulder the burden. More probably,
however, the effect of the law will be that one of the competing producers will seize
the opportunity to divorce itself from retail operations and market its products solely
through independents at a price in which the cost of the progressive tax would not
have to be represented. Other companies would be driven to follow suit, thus leav-
ing the field to the individual retailers. While the cost of the progressive tax would
in this event be avoided, the ultimate effect both on the consumer and the industry
would be prejudicial. It is apparent that an independent operator cannot ordinarily
offer the superior service and equipment which the capital of the large companies
makes possible. And since the cost of retailing is largely overhead, the unit cost
to the consumer could be materially reduced by eliminating rather than fostering
the great number of unnecessary and inefficient independents, and marketing solely
through a smaller number of large, strategically located company stations.
If these were the only factors to be considered, the court's decision would be without
justification on either legal or economic grounds. When the constitutionality of a
law is called in question, however, it must be presumed that the legislature formulated
its purpose in the light of all pertinent considerations; the province of the
court is to determine only whether the classification made is reasonably related to some
valid end sought to be achieved.20 In the instant case the probable purpose of the
legislature is not difficult to find. Highly centralized retailing, it is widely believed,
despite its advantages to industry and consumer, entails increased unemployment and
destroys the economic independence of the "little man." And the very fact that
the chains are more efficient and might in the long run drive the independents from
the field, indicates a legitimate basis for the classification here proposed. Indeed,
it has been ably argued that size alone is sufficient to sustain discrimination in taxa-
tion.2 ' If, therefore, the Indiana legislature is concerned to protect its citizens
against an aggressive mercantile centralization no matter how efficient, it is at least
not clear that the courts are under a duty to say that the state cannot effect its
policy by means of the law in question.
19. The company stations of the "standard" group were established long before any
independents entered the field. ZinamrAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52. See 1930 CssUs:
R'rAir DisTR, uT3o:x, STATE SEPIEs (1029) INDIAA, Table 6.
20. Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477 (1913); Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana,
233 U. S. 331 (1914) ; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1916) ; Alaska Fish
Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); Fort Smith Lumber Co. v.
Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532 (1920); cf. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928). See
cases collected in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 15, at 406, n. 4.
21. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra note 2, at 541,
564, 569, 580.
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APPOINTMIENT OF RECEIVERS By FEDERAL COURTS PENDING MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
IN the federal courts the rule is uniform that a 'right to a receiver for rents and
profits is not accorded a mortgagee upon a mere showing of a right to foreclosure'
or to a pledge of income on the mortgagor's default,2 but that the appointment lies
within the discretion of the court.3 In addition to recognizing the usual grounds
of inadequacy of the mortgaged property as security, insolvency of the mortgagor,
and the prevention of waste as bases for the appointment of receivers, the federal
courts have considered such pertinent factors as fraud of the mortgagor in attempt-
ing to create a hostile title in a third party,4 the desirability of displacing the
existing management,5 and delay by the mortgagee in requesting relief.6 And where
necessary, the receivership has been extended to embrace property not included
in the mortgage.7 Typical of this federal practice is a recent decision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appealss in which the appointment of a receiver for rents and profits
on the ground that the mortgaged property, including a hotel and office building
properties, could be conserved only by continued operation and that there was an
impairment of security through default in taxes, was held to constitute a reasonable
exercise of discretion.
In a majority of states, by judicial construction alone9 or with the addition of
statutory confirmation,' 0 the appointment of receivers has likewise been considered
1. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co., 36 Fed. 221, 224
(C. C. D. Kan. 1833).
2. Thomson v. Shirley, 69 Fed. 484 (C. C. D. Ore. 1895).
3. The power has been regarded as inherent in federal equity. Cassedy v. Strauch,
56 F. (2d) 493, 494 (App. D. C. 1932); cf. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 395
(1882); Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494, 503 (1888). See
also Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winona and Southwestern Ry. Co., 59 Fed. 957, 960
(C. C. D. Minn. 1893). The relative injury and benefit to the parties and the public
should be weighed, Bosworth v. St. Louis Terminal Rr. Association, 174 U. S. 182, 186
(1899), so that injustice is done to no one, Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 253 (1878).
See factors noted for granting a receiver in Mercantile Trust Co. v. Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Ry. Co., supra note 1, at 226, and for refusing it in American Loan and Trust
Co. v. Toledo, Cleveland and Sandusky Ry. Co., 29 Fed. 416 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1886).
4. Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Central Trust Co., 93 Fed. 286 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899).
5. Romare v. Broken Arrow Coal and Mining Co., 114 Fed. 194, 199, 200 (C. C.
N. D. Ala. 1902) (receivership for a mine denied on the ground that it could be more
competently managed without a receiver).
6. Cone v. Combs, 18 Fed. 576 (C. C. D. Minn. 1883) (receivership denied). Other
factors that have been considered include the "nature" of the property involved [Boyce
v. Continental Wire Co., 125 Fed. 740, 742 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); cf. Wabash, St. Louis
and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 23 Fed. 513, 514, 515 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1885)],
the existence of rents and profits, Eastern Trust and Banking Co. v. American Ice Co.,
14 App. D. C. 304 (1899) (denying a receiver), and the desire to "preserve and control
the sole asset", Speers Sand and Clay Works v. American Trust Co., 20 F. (2d) 333
(C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
7. Hoover v. Mortgage Co. For America, 290 Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
8. B. G. Carbajal, Inc. v. Enochs, 68 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. Sth, 1934).
9. See, e.g., Webb v. Marozas, 268 Ill. App. 338 (1932); Sheakley v. Mechler, 199
Iowa 1390, 203 N. W. 929 (1925); Peters v. Bossmann, 180 Wis. 62, 192 N. W. 465 (1923).
10. Legis. (1933) 3 Dmorr L. REV. 142, 144, where numerous statutes are collected.
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within the scope of the equity court's discretion. However, in some of the states,
particularly where there is a statutory prohibition against depriving a mortgagor
of possession prior to the consummation of foreclosure proceedings," there has in
practice been a severe curtailment of the power to make such appointment. Thus
in Minnesota the inadequacy of the mortgaged property as security and the insol-
vency of the mortgagor have been considered insufficient grounds for receiverships,'
2
in striking contrast to the federal practice of appointing receivers for such cause.13
Similarly, in Michigan, the accumulation of unpaid taxes14 or the necessity of care
and maintenance of mortgaged property,'-5 recognized grounds for the appointment
of receivers in the federal courts, 16 have been held inadequate. And in one state,
North Dakota, there is an absolute denial of the inherent power of the court to
appoint receivers for rents and profits not only prior to foreclosure, but even before
the expiration of the period of redemption, during which the mortgagor cannot be
ousted of possession.17
It is thus apparent that in a number of jurisdictions there exists a sharp cleavage
between state and federal practice. If advantage be taken of this by mortgagees,
the question must be met as to whether the federal courts will be bound by the
state practice or will feel free to accord relief to a creditor lacking adequate grounds
for a state receiver but meeting the technical requirements of federal jurisdiction.
The stated test that the federal courts will be bound by state statutes' s as inter-
preted in state decisions 19 only where substantive rights are involved and not with
respect to questions of remedy,20 resolves itself into the issue of whether the
granting of a receiver for rents and profits is a matter of right or remedy. State
decisions prescribing the causes for which a receiver may be procured were early
regarded as involving substantive law,2' with the result that a provision in a
11. M ca. COMP. LAws (1929) § 14956 is typical.
12. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Broadbent, 77 Minn. 175, 79 N. W. 676 (1899);
Minnesota Building and Loan Association v. Murphy, 176 Minn. 71, 222 N. W. 516 (1928).
13. Strain v. Palmer, 159 Fed. 623 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908); see Cone v. Combs, supra
note 6.
14. Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Rau, 255 Mich. 324, 23S N. WV. 166 (1931); Detroit
Trust Co. v. Lipsitz, 264 Mich. 404, 249 N. W. 892 (1933). But cf. Nusbaum v. Shapero,
249 Mich. 252, 228 N. W. 785 (1930).
15. White v. Fulton, 260 Mich. 346, 244 N. W. 498 (1932).
16. Unpaid taxes, Southern Building and Loan Association v. Carey, 114 Fed. 288,
289 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902), and necessity for continued operation, Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co. v. Meridian Waterworks Co., 139 Fed. 661 (C. C. S. D. Miss. 1905), are each
sufficient to justify a federal receivership.
17. Farm Mortgage Loan Co. v. Pettet, 51 N. D. 491, 200 N. W. 497 (1924) (implying
that there is a right to receivership only when there is physical deterioriation of the
property). Washington courts also tend somewhat to restrict their discretion. Lich v.
Strohm, 134 Wash. 490, 236 Pac. 88 (1925).
18. Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, 634 (1877).
19. Elmira Mechanics' Society v. Stanchfield, 160 Fed. 811, 813, 814 (C. C. A. 8th,
1908); see Toole-Tietzen & Co. v. Colorado River Development Co., 38 F. (2d) 850, 852 (S.
D. Cal. 1930).
20. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 114 (1915).
21. See Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Mills Plaster Co., 37 Fed. 286,
292 (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1889); cf. Elmira Mechanics' Society v. Stanchfield, supra note
19, at 814.
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mortgage stipulating that on the institution of foreclosure proceedings for defaults
of the debtor a receiver of rents and profits should be appointed has been held
unenforceable in the federal courts because prohibited by state law.
22 However, it
is doubtful whether the federal courts need feel bound to depart from their flexible
standard and adopt the more rigid state procedure, especially since the statement
of the Supreme Court in Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen23 that a receivership "de-
termines no substantive right" but is merely a question of remedy. Additional
reliance may be placed upon the fact that state legislation and decisions are held
powerless to curtail inherent powers of a federal court of equity,24 one of which
is the granting of a receiver pending mortgage foreclosure. While cases of actual
conflict between state and federal decisions arising in the same jurisdictions are few,
there have been instances in which the federal courts have granted receivers where
they would probably have been denied in the state courts. Thus despite two early
Michigan decisions denying that a receivership could be obtained prior to actual
foreclosure,25 a federal court for the District of Michigan granted one "distinguish-
ing" the two decisions on the ground that they could not be applicable to waste.
26
In another instance, a California ruling to the effect that injury to mortgaged prop-
erty was insufficient cause for a receivership where adequate security remained to
satisfy the mortgage debt27 was ignored by a District Court in California which,
despite the adequacy of the security, confirmed the grant of a receiver because of
injury resulting from abandonment of the mortgaged property.28
But even though the federal courts have this power, it may well be questioned
whether they should be quick to superimpose their standard where there is a diverse
state practice. That there is little need for such action is evidenced by the paucity of
federal decisions on receiverships pending mortgage foreclosures. Suits to foreclose
mortgages on realty are peculiarly local in nature, and more appropriately belong
in the state courts. The federal rule has the virtue of extreme flexibility and should
perhaps be adopted in the state courts,2 9 but the fortuitous presence of diversity
of citizenship and jurisdictional amount is scarcely a sufficient basis for discriminat-
ing between two creditors seeking to foreclose mortgages on realty situated in the
same county or state.
22. Couper v. Shirley, 75 Fed. 168 (C. C. A. 9th, 1896); cf. Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S.
242 (1884).
23. 261 U. S. 491, 497 (1923).
24. Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451, 457 (1892); cf. Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow,
149 U. S. 574, 579 (1893).
25. Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 364 (1877); Hazeltine v. Granger, 44 Mich. 503, 7 N. W.
74 (ISSO).
26. See Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Mills Plaster Co., supra note 21.
This qualification was apparently also adopted by the Michigan courts at a later time,
but rigidly restricted. See cases cited note 14, supra.
27. Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 164 Cal. 58, 127
Pac. 502 (1912); see Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sunset Road Oil Co., So Cal. App. 485, 495,
195 Pac. 466, 470 (1920).
28. Toole-Tietzen & Co. v. Colorado River Development Co., supra note 19.
29. New Jersey has so changed from a restrictive, Horer v. Dey, 61 N. J. Eq. 554,
49 At. 154 (1901), to a flexible practice, Broad & Market National Bank v. Larsen, 88
N. 3. Eq. 245, 102 Atl. 265 (1917). Protection from personal eviction, the basis of a
rigid state procedure is, however, provided. Rehberger v. Wegener, 107 N. 3. Eq. 391,
152 At. 700 (1930).
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RENUNCIATION oF TESTAMENTARY GIFT TO DEFEAT CLAIMS OF DEVISEE'S CREDITORS
TITLE to realty is generally conceived of either as vesting in the heirs or devisees of
the owner at his death, subject to being divested through renunciation by the benefi-
ciary and by the necessity of sale to satisfy the debts of the deceased, or as not
passing until an actual acceptance occurs.1 Both renunciation and acceptance, as
the case may be, are considered to relate back and become operative from the time
of the deceased's death. The significance of these theories of property succession is
evidenced by a recent Florida decision2 which seems to run counter to the usual doc-
trines. A testatrix named her four children as residuary legatees and devisees of her
estate in equal shares. One year after his mother's death, and eleven days before
the entry of a substantial judgment against him, one son so designated as beneficiary
executed a formal renunciation of both his testate and intestate interest in the proper-
ty. Subsequently, the judgment creditors attempted to subject certain realty in the
estate, which by the terms of the will would pass in the residuary clause, to a sale
under execution. In an action by the residuary devisees and the administrator c. t. a.
to restrain the proposed sale, the bill was dismissed since the court found that the
complainants did not own the property which they sought to protect, and that there
was an insufficient equity to warrant an injunction against the sale of property under
"a valid judgment and execution."
In general, the power to renounce the provisions of a will is personal, to be exercised
only by the beneficiary, and not by his administrator
3 or creditors.4 To be effective,
such a renunciation need not be in writing
5 but must be of an unequivocal nature.
6
The acceptance of a beneficial devise is presumed,
7 however, and the beneficiary may
be denied the power to renounce through long delay,
8 or if he has induced creditors to
1. 2 PAGE, LAW OF WV.s (2d ed. 1926) §§ 1233, 1234; cf. 4 ScomLER, LAW oF WILLs,
EXECUTORS, ADMINSTRATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 3155..
2. Kearley v. Crawford, 151 So. 293 (Fla. 1933).
3. Harding v. Harding, 140 Ky. 277, 130 S. W. 1098 (1910); cf. In re Mihiman's Estate,
140 Misc. 535, 251 N. Y. Supp. 147 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (administrator cannot exercise the
widow's right to take against the will). But the court may make such an election for an
insane devisee. In re Brown, 212 App. Div. 677, 209 N. Y. Supp. 288 (2d Dep't 1925),
aff'd, 240 N. Y. 646, 148 N. E. 742 (1925) (election to take under the will and renounce a
dower interest).
4. Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314, 213 N. W. 608 (1927); Bottom r. Fultz, 124 Ky.
302, 98 S. W. 1037 (1907). Nor can creditors compel their debtor to renounce a provision
made under a will in order to secure a more profitable distribution through curtesy or a sta-
tutory share. Bains v. Globe Bank & Trust Co., 136 Ky. 332, 124 S. W. 343 (1910) ; Austin
v. Collins, 297 S. W. 36 (Mo. 1927); In re Fleming's Estate, 217 Pa. St. 610, 66 Atl. 874
(1907).
5. Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505 (1896). Where a devise is condi-
tioned upon payment of certain sums to third persons by the beneficiary, mere failure to
make such payments shows an intent to renounce. Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 378, 140 Atl.
100 (1928); cf. American Church Missionary Society v. Griswold College, 27 Misc. 42,
58 N. Y. Supp. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1899); In re Mahlstedt's Will, 140 Misc. 245, 250 N. Y. Supp.
628 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
6. Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N. E. 846 (1931).
7. 3 Wom=x, AERicAN LAW Or ADnnusTRArion (3d ed. 1923) § 440.
8. Crumpler v. Barfield & Wilson Co., 114 Ga. 570, 40 S. E. 808 (1902); Strom v. Wood,
100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917). The right of an administratrLx to so renounce in behalf
of her intestate has been denied solely on the ground of laches in making such a renuncia-
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rely upon his apparent acceptance as a source of credit9 or because of the existence of
a collusive agreement with those benefiting by such a renunciation. 10 It is imma-
terial whether the renunciation is made simply for the purpose of avoiding an onerous
condition imposed by the testator in making the gift," or of escaping the incidence of
inheritance taxation,' 2 or to deprive creditors of a means of satisfying their claims. 13
In the last situation it might seem that where the renunciation is made after the entry
of judgment against the debtor, there would be a stronger case for denying the power
to renounce, but even here the renunciation has been held to be effective. 14 Under
the theory that the disclaimer relates back to the time of the testator's death, the
bequest is regarded as never having taken effect and consequently there can be no con-
veyance in fraud of creditors.' Similarly, a renunciation by a judgment debtor of
a gift inter vivos has been held to defeat the claims of judgment creditors.' 6 Here
again acceptance is an essential element to the validity of the gift, and a refusal to ac-
cept renders it inoperative ab initio as to the purported donee.
In view of these seemingly well-established principles, the decision of the Florida
court in the present case would appear somewhat unorthodox. Since the debtor had
formally renounced both his testate and intestate17 interest in the property of the de-
ceased, under the theory that the renunciation relates back to the death of the
testatrix, he retained no interest which could be made subject to sale. And accord-
ingly title to the property was at all times in the remaining children, either as residu-
ary devisees or as intestate successors of the renounced share of the residuum. Since
the judgment debtor, therefore, had effectually avoided any title or interest in the
tion. In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (1932), noted in (1933) 81 U. or
PA. L. Rnv. 645.
9. See Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 707 (1879).
10. See Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 478, 187 N. W. 20, 22 (1922), noted in
(1923) 36 HAuv. L. REv. 347; Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 60, 109 S. W. 502, 504
(190S).
11. Winquist v. Doering, 135 Kan. 92, 9 P. (2d) 632 (1932).
12. People v. Flanagin, 331 111. 203, 162 N. E. 848 (1928); In re Stone's Estate, 132
Iowa 136, 109 N. W. 455 (1906); In re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div. 349, 85 N. Y. Supp.
949 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 599, 72 N. E. 1152 (1904); Tax Commission of Ohio
v. Glass, 119 Ohio St. 389, 164 N. E. 425 (1928); cf. In re Johnston's Estate, 186 Wis. 599,
203 N. W. 376 (1925).
13. See it re Meiburg, 1 F. Supp. 892, 895 (N. D. Iowa 1932).
14. Schoonover v. Osborne, supra note 10, at 477, 187 N. W. at 22; Lehr v. Switzer, 213
Iowa 658, 239 N. W. 564 (1931), noted in (1932) 17 IowA L. REv. 534, and (1933) 31 MIcH.
L. REv. 443; cf. Shedenhelm v. Cafferty, 174 Iowa 195, 156 N. W. 340 (1916).
15. Cf. Piekenbrock & Sons v. Knoer, 136 Iowa 534, 114 N. W. 200 (1907); see In re
Meyer's Estate, 137 Misc. 730, 734, 244 N. Y. Supp. 398, 401 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Bradford v.
Calhoun, supra note 10, at 60, 109 S. W. at 504.
16. Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa 272, 228 N. W. 93 (1929), noted in (1930) 18 CALIF.
L. REv. 298, and (1930) 14 Mrnw. L. Rxv. 570; cf. Stoehr v. Miller, 296 Fed. 414 (C. C. A.
2d, 1923), noted in (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 789.
17. If the son had renounced only his testate share, the judgment creditor would still
have had an attachable interest, since a renounced or lapsed portion of a residuum passes
by intestacy, and not to the remaining residuary legatees. Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140, 25
AtI. 354 (1892) ; Magnuson v. Magnuson, 197 Ill. 496, 64 N. E. 371 (1902) ; Lehr v. Switzer,
supra note 14, at 663, 239 N. W. at 566; In re Hoffman's Will, 201 N. Y. 247, 94 N. E. 990
(1911) ; Wright v. Wright, 225 N. Y. 329, 122 N. E. 213 (1919). Contra: Corbett v. Skaggs,
111 Kan. 380, 207 Pac. 819 (1922).
property to be sold, and since the actual owners were not parties to the action in
which execution was issued, clearly the granting of an injunction to restrain the sale
would be legally proper.' 8 It must be apparent, however, that the doctrine which
causes a renunciation to relate back so as to be operative from the moment of the
deceased's death is largely conceptual, and its indiscriminate application may frequent-
ly lead to an inequitable result. Consequently, despite its apparent departure from
the conventional approach, the result reached by the Florida court is to some ex-
tent justified in denying an indigent debtor the power to defeat those having valid
claims against him. Unquestionably a beneficial devise would be accepted in the ab-
sence of such claims, and to permit the devisee to avoid satisfaction by such a renun-
ciation is to work a hardship on those who have extended credit to him.19 While in a
family affair of this nature it would be practically impossible to show the existence of
actual collusion among beneficiaries under the will sufficient to estop the renunciation,
it is difficult to believe that a tacit understanding of some sort did not exist. The
situation suggests the wisdom of a rule of construction which would operate as strict-
ly as possible against the validity of the renunciation.
CIVL SUITS FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE AcT
A FAmRoAD employee, resident of Indiana, brought suit in the Federal Court for
the Northern District of Indiana against the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany, a Virginia corporation, to recover for personal injuries sustained in Kentucky.
Uncertain of the legal interpretation of the circumstances under which he was
injured, the plaintiff alleged alternatively that the accident occurred in interstate
commerce and that his cause of action consequently arose under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act' and the Federal Safety Appliance Act; 2 and that since the
accident occurred in intrastate commerce, his cause of action arose under the Ken-
tucky Employers' Liability Act 3 and the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Under
18. Jarvis v. Chanslor & Lyon Co., 20 Ariz. 134, 177 Pac. 27 (1919); Yount v. Hoover,
95 Kan. 752, 149 Pac. 408 (1915) ; see Carrell v. Meek, 155 Mo. App. 337, 340, 137 S. W.
19, 20 (1911); 5 PoarxRoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) §§ 2093, 2094; 2 LAW-
RENCr, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (1929) § 979; 3 FREE£mAN, EXECUTIONs (3d ed. 1900) § 438.
19. In a somewhat analogous situation judgment creditors have been protected to the
extent of permitting them to contest a will which leaves their debtor nothing. Brooks v.
Paine, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S. W. 600 (1906); In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N. W. 1133
(1891) ; Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N. E. 604 (1908). Contra: Lockard v. Stephen-
son, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899); Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 Ati. 835 (1926),
noted in (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 150. But a general creditor may not so contest. Watson v.
Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S. W. 478 (1898); In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 32 Atl.
1040 (1895).
1. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51 et seq. (1926).
2. 36 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1926).
3. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 820 b-1, 820 b-2, 820 b-3. The statute is practically
a literal reenactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Moreover, the statute
incorporates the benefits of the Federal Safety Appliance Act by providing that no
employee shall be held "to have been guilty of contributory negligence" or "to have
assumed the risk of his employment" in any case "where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute state or federal enacted for the safety of employees contributed
to the injury or death of such employee."
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either allegation federal jurisdiction was available because of diversity of citizenship.
4
The defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the trial court as to the first count
on the ground that even though the Federal Employers' Liability Act permitted
suit at the place where the defendant was doing business, in so far as the action
was based on the Safety Appliance Act it could only be brought in the jurisdiction
of the defendant's residence. The second count was challenged on the theory that
the plaintiff had not relied "solely" on diversity of citizenship but had also invoked
the Safety Appliance Act, and that therefore the action could not be brought at
the place of the plaintiff's residence but only at the defendant's domicile. The
trial court overruled these objections and the plaintiff won a judgment on the merits.
Upon appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the defendant's contentions and
remanded the case with permission to the plaintiff to amend his complaint to rely
in the first paragraph exclusively upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
in the second exclusively upon the Kentucky Employers' Liability Act, thus exclud-
ing all reference to the Federal Safety Appliance Act.5 The Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Circuit Court and ordered that the plaintiff's complaint
should stand.6 In dispensing with the objection to the first count the Court em-
phasized the fact that under the express terms of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act an action brought under its provisions may try the question of a violation of
the Safety Appliance Act; the two statutes, moreover, have always been considered
in pari inateria.7 In answer to the objection to the second paragraph the Court
declared that the Safety Appliance Act, while impliedly recognizing a right of action
for a violation of its provisions, does not give rise to a cause of action under the
laws of the United States cognizable in a federal court in the absence of diversity
of citizenship. Consequently the plaintiff must- have relied "solely" on "diversity"
for jurisdiction to sue in the District Court at his place of residence even though
he had also alleged a violation of the Safety Appliance Act as a measure of the
defendant's liability. The Circuit Court of Appeals had also argued that to hold
that the plaintiff could base his cause of action exclusively upon a state statute
because the accident occurred in intrastate commerce, and then to permit him to
prove the negligence required thereunder by showing a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act would be improperly to extend the benefits of a federal statute to
intrastate commerce. There is ample authority, however, for applying the Safety
Appliance Act to employees engaged in intrastate commerce.
8
Several early cases indicated that the Safety Appliance Act merely prescribed
a duty of the employer and that an action for a breach thereof must be based upon
the common law;9 but the question has not been free from doubt. The Safety
Appliance Act of 1893,10 while eliminating the defense of assumption of risk, and
thus implying that a civil action could be brought for a breach of its provisions,
made no mention of contributory negligence. And for this reason on two occasions
4. 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (1926). In order to gain the advantage
of suing at the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, the plaintiff must rely
"only" on diversity of citizenship for the jurisdiction of the federal court.
S. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Moore, 64 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
6. Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 402 (1934).
7. See San Antonio Ry. and Arkansas Pass Ry. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U. S. 476, 484 (1916).
8. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916); Louisville & Nashville
Rr. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617 (1917).
9. See Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, supra note 8, at 39.
10. 27 STAT. 531 (1893).
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where the Employers' Liability Act was not controlling, the Supreme Court refused
to review the state court's ruling on the question of contributory negligence in cases
including a breach of the Safety Appliance Act, declaring that outside the particular
point of assumption of risk mentioned by the Act, the law of the state governed."
Moreover, in one instance where the violation of the Act had caused the death of
an employee, the Court held that an action for such wrongful death must depend
upon the applicable state statute, thus clearly indicating that the Act alone was
not deemed to create any such right.' 2 On the other hand, at a later date, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals in a case wherein
the latter court had declared in unequivocal language that the Act of itself gives
rise to such an action.
13
In the instant case the Court's adoption of the former view enabled the plaintiff
to invoke the Act and still to sue in a federal court of a jurisdiction other than that
of the defendant's residence. The same interpretation of the Act has recently been
applied by a lower federal court to allow the plaintiff to remain in a state court
while alleging a breach of the Act.14 There the plaintiff had commenced her suit
in the state court to recover damages for the wrongful death of an employee. She
alleged that the accident had occurred in interstate commerce, and offered to prove
not only negligence on the part of the defendant but also, without mentioning the
Safety Appliance Act, facts which constituted a breach thereof. Since there was
no diversity of citizenship between the parties, the defendant sought to remove the
case to the federal District Court on the ground that it arose under the laws of the
United States, citing as a precedent the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the principal case. The District Court remanded the case, declaring that the
Safety Appliance Act gave rise to no cause of action and that the plaintiff was not
subject to removal even if she had relied upon it. The decision would likewise
apply, of course, where the accident admittedly occurred in intrastate commerce.
The latter application of the interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act here
accepted by the Supreme Court is particularly important, since the state court
may offer many advantages to the plaintiff. In the federal courts, by virtue of the
Seventh Amendment, a unanimous jury is required to return a verdict,1r while in
several states the plaintiff need persuade only a lesser number.", And in jurisdic-
tions where the scintilla of evidence rule is recognized the trial court must submit
the case to the jury if the plaintiff has produced any evidence to support the
11. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 590 (1911);
Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., v. Popplar, 237 U. S. 369 (1915).
In the former case the accident occurred in intrastate commerce so that the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act was not applicable; in the latter the accident had evidently occurred
before the Employers' Liability Act was passed.
12. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 (1908).
"The accident by which the plaintiff's intestate lost his life occurred in Indian territory,
where contrary to the doctrine of the common law, a right of action for death exists.
The cause of action arose under the laws of the territory and was enforced in the courts
of Kansas." Id. at 285.
13. Ross v. Schooley, 257 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919), cert. den., 249 U. S. 615 (1919).
14. Summers v. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co., 4 F. Supp. 410 (E. D. Ky. 1933).
15. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464 (1897); Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899).
16. Minneapolis and St. Louis Rr. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1916), aff'g 128
Minn. 112, 150 N. W. 385 (1914) (where plaintiff's verdict rendered by five-sixths of the
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essential elements of his case,17 whereas in the federal courts a verdict may be
directed on the preponderance of the evidence.' 8 Where the local rule permits, more-
over, the plaintiff can plead in the alternative a cause of action arising in interstate
commerce under the Employers' Liability Act and one in intrastate commerce under
the state law.' 9 Thus, certainly in the absence of diversity of citizenship, the
employee, under a statute similar to that of Kentucky, can make use of a violation
of the Safety Appliance Act in both counts and, if the evidence establishes intrastate
commerce so that his action under the Employers' Liability Act fails, he can still
rely upon his cause under the state statute without being subject to removal. The
employee is never subject to removal under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
since that statute specifically provides for a suit in the state court.20
It is not clear, however, that the advantages of suit in a state court would be
available to a plaintiff where, as in the instant case, there is a diversity of citizen-
ship. Some lower federal courts have held that a plaintiff can plead causes of action
under both the state statute and the Employers' Liability Act without being subject
to removal on grounds of diversity of citizenship, but others have ruled that under
such circumstances the defendant may remove the whole case to the federal court.2 1
The Supreme Court has not as yet passed upon the question.
jury according to the state law was upheld in a case under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act; St. Louis and San Francisco Rr. Co. v. Brown, 241 U. S. 223 (1916) (Oklahoma statute
allowing nine of twelve jurors to render a verdict upheld in a similar action).
17. E.g., Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co. v. Johnson's Administration, 161 Ky. 824,
171 S. W. 847 (1914); 2 WimoR, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2494, n. 12.
1. Commissioners of Marion County v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278 (1876); Ewing v. Goode,
78 Fed. 442 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1897).
19. New York Central and Hudson River Er. Co v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340 (1922).
Alternative pleading is also sanctioned in the federal courts. Missouri, Kansas and Texas
Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570 (1913).
20. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act an action may be brought in the
federal District Courts "in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time
of commencing such action.' 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1926). An action
brought in the state court under this Act cannot be removed to the federal court, although
violation of the Safety Appliance Act is involved. St. Joseph & Grand Island Ry. Co. v.
Moore, 243 U. S. 311 (1917).
21. Ullrich v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Er. Co., 193 Fed. 768 (S. D.
N. Y. 1912) (denying removal); Strother v. Union Pacific Er. Co., 220 Fed. 731 (W. D.
Mo. 1915) (allowing removal); 2 ROBERTs, LiABiLrry oF FEDERAL CARRn s (2d ed. 1929)
§ 967.
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